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FOREWORD 
"Burglary is a common law crime, and is an 
offense against the living quarters of the 
residents ... which may be committed only at 
night; whereas, housebreaking is a statutory 
crime and is an offense against right to 
possession, and it may be committed against 
any building at any time of night or day." 
Ron. John T. Gentry 
County Judge 
Pickens County 
South Carolina 
-3-
CONTENTS 
Page 
Foreword by Ron. John T. Gentry................. 2 
Housebreaking ......................•...........• 4 
Larceny with Housebreaking ....•..........•..•... 7 
Entering without Breaking - Concealment .•........ 9 
Attempt to Commit a Felony...................... 11 
FLEMING'S NOTEBOOK, Chapter 101................. 22 
Warning Officer Rule (State Supreme Court) .... 22 
Bishop Ruling. . . . . . • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
McNabb and Mallory Rulings ..................•. 25 
Fleming's Rule on Indigents ................... 27 
-4-
HOUSEBREAKING 
Section 16-332, 1962 Code of Laws of South 
Carolina: 
§16-332. HOUSEBREAKING WHICH IS NOT BURGLARY. 
Every person who shall break and enter or who shall 
break with intent to enter, in the daytime, any 
dwelling house or other house or who shall break and 
enter or shall break with intent to enter, in the 
nighttime, any house the breaking and entering of 
which would not constitute burglary, with intent to 
commit a felony or other crime of a lesser grade, 
shall be held guilty of a felony and punishable at 
the discretion of the court by imprisonment in the 
county jail or Penitentiary for a term not exceeding 
five years. 
The purpose of the housebreaking statute was to 
cover an area of wrongdoings that did not amount to 
burglary. At the common law, burglary was a crime, 
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but breaking and entering a storebuilding for the 
purpose of stealing was not. It is for this reason 
that 'housebreaking' is known as a statutory crime, 
whereas 'burglary' is a common law crime. 
State v. Alford, 142 SC 43, 140 SE 261. 
Housebreaking is a crime that violates the right 
of the owner or other person lawfully in possession 
of the premises to exclusive possession of such 
premises. The mere breaking and entering of the 
premises of another without 'intent to commit a crime' 
is not housebreaking. State v. Melton, 181 SC 482, 188 
SE 133. A jury may find as a fact that 'intent to 
commit a crime' was present in the mind of one who 
breaks and enters, even tho no stealing or other 
crime actually took place. Circumstances may lawfully 
support a finding of such 'intent'. In other words, 
circumstantial evidence may establish proof of 'intent 
to commit a crime'. 
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In order to constitute the crime of burglary, 
the breaking and entering must be in a 'dwelling 
house', whereas in housebreaking the crime may be 
committed with respect to any building whatsoever. 
State v. Ginns, 1 N. and McC. 583. 
Although there must be a 'breaking'of some kind 
in order to constitute the crime of housebreaking, 
a very slight breaking is sufficient. If, for 
example, a closed but unlatched screen door is 
opened by the felon in order to gain entrance, such 
act is enough to constitute a 'breaking'. 
State v. Clamp, 225 SC 89. 
There need be no other crime actually committed 
to make out the crime of housebreaking. It is the 
'intent' to steal or commit some other crime in the 
building that is essential. Statev. Christensen, 
194 SC 131, 9 SE 2d 555. 
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When another crime ... such a larceny ..• is 
actually committed, however, it is a separate and 
distinct offense and may be charged as an additional 
count in the arrest warrant and the indictment. 
Cope land v. Manning, 234 SC 510, 109 SE 2d 361. 
The crime of housebreaking may be committed at 
anytime of the day or night. Section 16-332, 1962 
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EXAMPLE AFFIDAVIT 
'' ... that one John Roe did in this County on 
the 1st day of January, 1974, break and enter 
the warehouse of one Richard Doe, located at 
103 Roebuck Road, near Alaskaville, with intent 
to commit a crime therein." 
Code of Laws. WHEN LARCENY COMMITTED 
Although housebreaking and burglary are serious 
crimes, the setting of a 'spring gun' to prevent 
entry is not lawful. State v. Green, 118 SC 279, 110 
SE 145. 
1. 
2. 
CHECKLIST FOR HOUSEBREAKING 
Breaking. 
Entering. 
3. Of any building of another. 
4. With intent to commit a crime. 
(Second Count) 
" ... that one John Roe did in this County on 
the 1st day of January, 1974, steal, i.e., 
take and carry away with intent to deprive the 
owner permanently thereof, certain goods of 
one Richard Doe of the value of more than fifty 
dollars, such goods being described: locks and 
keys, chisels, ammunition, and other items of 
hardware." 
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ENTERING WITHOUT BREAKING CHECKLIST 
AND CONCEALMENT 
1. Entering or attempting to enter. 
Section 16-361, 1962 Code of Laws of South 2. Any house or vessel whatsoever. 
Carolina: 3. With intent to steal or commit some other crime. 
)) 
§16-361. ENTERING HOUSE OR VESSEL WITHOUT EXAMPLE AFFIDAVITS 
BREAKING WITH INTENT TO STEAL; ATTEMPT TO ENTER. 
Any person who shall enter, without breaking, or 
" ... that one John Doe did enter the warehouse 
attempt to enter any house or vessel whatsoever, of one Richard Roe in this County on the 1st 
with intent to steal or commit any other crime or day of January, 1974, with intent to commit 
shall conceal himself in any house or vessel, with a crime therein." 
like intent, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, 
upon conviction thereof, shall be punished in the 
" ... that one John Doe did conceal himself in 
discretion of the court. ) the store of one Richard Roe located at 1000 
Commerce Street in the City of Plainville in 
'House' is not confined to living quarters. this County on the 1st day of January, 1974, 
It includes any building of any kind whatsoever used with intent to commit a crime therein." 
to house anything or designed to house anything. 
The term 'house' is broad enough to include an office. 
State v. Ross, 83 SC 434. 
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ATTEMPT TO COMMIT FELONY 
It is a crime in South Carolina for a person to 
attempt to commit a felony, even tho the crime is 
never accomplished. This is under the common law 
and, although, just as effective as any other law, 
will not be found in the South Carolina Code of Laws. 
State v. Maner 20 SC L 453. 
An attempt to commit a misdemeanor is not a 
crime. Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 125. 
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NOTES FROM WHARTON'S 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 
DEFINITION 
An attempt is an act done with the intent of 
committing a crime, but which fails of completion. 
To constitute an attempt, the defendant must, (1) 
with the intent to commit a specific crime, (2) do 
an overt act directed to its commission, which goes 
beyond mere preparation and is apparently suitable 
for that purpose, but (3) which fails to result in 
the commission of the intended crime. 
An attempt is sometimes defined as any overt 
act done with the intent to commit a crime, which, 
except for the interference of some cause preventing 
the carrying out of the intent, would have resulted 
in the commission of the crime. In some states it is 
declared by statute that a person is guilty of an 
attempt if he attempts to commit any crime, but fails, 
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to accomplish it, or fails or is prevented or inter-
cepted in the perpetration of the offense. 
It is also said that an attempt is an intended 
apparent unfinished crime. This is a satisfactory 
statement if it is regarded as meaning only that 
)) 
there must be the intent to commit the ultimate 
uncompleted crime, that there must be an act advancing 
the carrying of the intent into execution, and that 
the effort of the defendant failed to achieve the 
intended criminal result. 
In some states attempts are defined by statute 
only with reference to particular crimes. 
) 
CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSE 
By the common law it is a misdemeanor to attempt 
to commit either a felony, or a malicious misdemeanor, 
whether common-law or statutory. Thus, it is a common-
law offense to attempt to commit arson, burglary, 
J 
I 
1 
~ 
~ 
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subornation of perjury, or to obtain money by false 
pretenses. 
Some courts hold that there can be no attempt 
to commit a misdemeanor which is merely malum 
prohibitum. 
As an exception to the general rule that there 
may be an attempt to commit any crime, it is held 
that there can be no attempt to commit a crime which 
in itself is merely an attempt, that is, that there 
can be no attempt to commit an attempt. Thus, since 
embracery is an attempt to bribe a jury, there cannot 
be an attempt to commit embracery. As an assault is 
an attempt to commit a battery, there can be no 
attempt to commit an assault. 
As a second exception, there can be no attempt 
to commit a crime the gravamen of which is negligence. 
By definition, the attempt must be committed with the 
intent to commit the crime, and an intentional 
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negligent act is a contradiction in terms. 
To constitute a criminal attempt, it is necessary 
that the act which is attempted be a crime. In 
jurisdictions in which suicide is not a crime, it has 
been held that an attempt at suicide is not criminal. 
At common law an attempt to commit suicide is 
indictable. 
THE MENTAL STATE 
There must be an intent to commit a specific 
crime to constitute an attempt, even though the 
commission of the crime itself might not require such 
a specific intent. Thus, although murder may be 
committed without a specific intent to kill, as under 
the felony murde r rule, there can be no attempt to 
commit murder without a specific intent to kill. 
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THE ACT 
To constitute an attempt, there must be an act 
directed to the commission of an intended crime, 
which act goes beyond mere preparation and is 
apparently suited for the intended prupose, although 
it may be any act in the series of acts which would 
ordinarily result in the commission of the crime, and 
need not be the last or final step in the sequence. 
Whether an act has passed beyond the stage of prepa-
ration and constitutes an attempt is a question of 
degree. 
It is commonly stated that the act of the 
defendant must have come so near the commission of 
the crime that it would have been consummated but 
for the intervention of some extraneous force or 
element. This is not always followed, and the more 
serious the intended crime the more willing are the 
courts to find that an act anterior to the last act 
preceding the commission of the offense is a 
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sufficient act to constitute an attempt. It is also 
said that when an intent to commit a specific crime 
is clearly shown, slight acts in furtherance of that 
intent will constitute an attempt. 
It is also variously stated that an attempt is 
a direct movement toward the commission of the crime 
after the preparations have been made; that the 
defendant's act must be a direct, unequivocal act 
toward the commission of the intended crime; that 
his acts must have progressed to the extent of giving 
him power to commit the offense and nothing but an 
interruption prevented the commission of the offense; 
that the defendant's act must reach far enough 
toward the accomplishment of his intention to commit 
the offense to amount to a commencement of the 
consummation or to be a step in the direct movement 
toward its commission; and that some appreciable 
fragment of the crime must be committed so that the 
crime would be completed if the defendant were not 
interrupted. 
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An attempt must be more than an intent. Mere 
words cannot constitute an offense, unless the fact 
of their utterance is in itself a substantive crime, 
as in the case of words that are libelous, seditious, 
obscene, or provocative of a breach of the peace, or 
that constitute solicitations to commit a crime. 
The overt act must be such as will apparently 
result, in the usual and natural course of events, 
in the commission of the intended crime if not 
interrupted in any way. 
PREPARATIONS 
Preparation to commit a crime is not punishable 
as an offense or an attempt. Preparation includes 
those acts which relate to the planning of the crime 
and the devising or obtaining the means or making 
arrangements for its execution. The distinction 
between preparation and an act which is an attempt 
to commit a crime for which the preparation was made 
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is not always simple or easy to make, and each case 
must necessarily be determined by its own circum-
stances. 
It has been held that the defendant is not 
guilty of an attempt if his actions were merely 
preparations, as when his actions consisted of 
looking for the intended victim; obtaining tools for 
the commission of a crime; purchasing and loading 
a gun; acquiring the means or a weapon with which to 
commit the intended crime; stopping to load his 
rifle, but not aiming it at the victim; arming him-
self and going to find his intended victim; watching 
a person's house and procuring a rope to tie him in 
a robbery; procuring hack saws to use in jail break-
ing; eloping with his niece and making arrangements 
for an incestuous marriage which was not performed; 
taking a small girl into the woods and snatching a 
button from her clothing with the intent to have 
intercourse; inviting a young boy into an automobile 
to commit indecencies; or making financial and 
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business arrangements for the performance of an 
abortion. 
EXAMPLE AFFIDAVIT 
" ... that one John Doe did in this County on 
the 1st day of January, 1974, attempt to 
commit the crime of housebreaking by attempting 
to break and 2nter the storebuilding of one 
Richard Roe located at 900 Wharf Street in the 
City of Carpline." 
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FLEMING'S NOTEBOOK FLEMING'S NOTEBOOK ... Chapter 101: 
One Rule of the Supreme Court, having the full 
force and effect of law, that is often overlooked 
or forgotten is Rule I of the South Carolina Supre me 
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Court promulgated under the Defens e of Indigents 
Act: 
"Rule 1. 
"Every person arrested for the commission of a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court of General 
Sessions ... and every person charged with the violation 
of a probationary sentence ..• shall be taken as soon 
I) 
as practicable before the Clerk of Court of General 
Sessions in the county where the charges are pre ferr ed, 
or such other officer or officers as may be designate d 
by the resident judge of the circuit, for the purpos e 
of securing to the accused the right to couns e l." 
Although a surface reading of Rule 1. would 
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indicate that every such defendant must be taken 
before a 'warning officer', the Supreme Court has 
explained that the Rule does not apply in all cases. 
In a case entitled State v. Bishop, 256 SC 158, 181 SE 
2d 477, a defendant convicted of grand larceny 
appealed to the Supreme Court on the ground that his 
confession was obtained by police before he was 
taken before a 'warning officer'. The Court denied 
relief, stating: 
"The Rule relied upon was intended to insure 
timely appointment of counsel for indigents 
charged with crime ... not to impose a condition 
upon the right of police officers to interrogate 
a willing suspect merely because he is in 
custody and has not been ... taken before a 
designated officer." 
While the Bishop case supplies some answers 
relative to the 'warning officer' rule, it leaves 
some questions unanswered. 
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QUESTIONS ~~SWERED 
It can be gotten from the Bishop case that the 
'warning officer' rule (Rule 1.) does not apply 
when a defendant is represented by counsel, and it 
follows, reasonably, that it does not apply when the 
defendant has been released on bond. Thus, any 
const'ruction of 'Rule 1.' that it requires that every 
general sessions court defendant in every case be 
carried before a 'warning officer', is in error. 
The Court itself says that it had no such purpose in 
mind. As a practical rule-of-thumb, the Rule, as 
construed by Bishop, seems to say: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
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WHAT MAY BE DONE 
'Rule 1' does not prevent proper questioning 
of an indigent defendant before he has been 
taken before the Clerk of Court, or other 
'warning officer'. 
If a defendant has an attorney or has been 
released on bond, 'Rule 1' does not apply. 
'Rule 1' does not apply except in cases of 
indigency. 
SUGGESTED ACTION 
As early as 1940, in a case entitled McNabbv. 
United States, 87 Led 819, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed the conviction of a defendant for the 
murder of a revenue agent because the defendant had 
been questioned by arresting officers for several 
hours before being brought before a Federal 
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Magistrate "without delay", as was required by 
Federal rules of court (Rule 5(a) ). No question 
of the voluntariness of McNabb's confession, upon 
which he was convicted, was involved. 
In 1955, in a case entitled Malloryv. United 
States, 1 Led 2d 1479, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed a rape conviction on the same ground 
as McNabb. Mallory had been questioned by police 
for several hours before being taken before a 
Federal magistrate. 
Although, admittedly, McNabb and Mallory are 
cases involving construction of Federal rules of 
court, and are not at this time strictly applicable 
to rules of state courts, the question of ''due 
process" is almost imperceptibly interwoven into 
the cloth of the question. It is strongly recommended 
that it is reasonable and advisable for police 
officers to follow these rules when dealing with 
indigent defendants in serious cases: 
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FLEMING'S RULE ON INDIGENTS 
I. An unrepresented indigent defendant should not 
be questioned after a warning officer has been 
readily available ••. even after proper Miranda 
warnings ... until after he has been warned under 
Rule 1 of the State Supreme Court (IndigentAct). 
II. An unrepresented indigent defendant may be 
questioned with his consent ••• after Miranda 
warnings ..• until such time as a warning officer 
is readily available. 
NOTE: The editor of the Notebook does not assert 
the foregoing Rule as being absolutely necessary under 
the Bishop case, supra, but such Rule is recommended 
as being the safest course to follow. It is the opin-
ion of this editor that the McNabb-Mallory wind is 
freshening and will inevitably be applied to state 
police action through the portal of constitutional 
due process. 30 •.• EFM 
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